37 Day Count Down to War - Day 35

July 31st 1914

On July 31, the Austrian Crown Council decided to continue the war against Serbia, and to ignore the dangers of Russian mobilisation in the expectation of German support. Nicholas wrote to Wilhelm to promise him that Russian general mobilisation was not aimed as a prelude to war, and stated:

"I thank you heartily for your mediation which begins to give one hope that all may yet end peacefully. It is technically impossible to our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria’s mobilisation. We are far from wishing war. As long as the negotiations with Austria on Serbia’s account are taking place my troops shall not make any provocative action. I give you my solemn word for this."

The German Ambassador in Paris delivered an ultimatum to Premier Viviani telling him that if Russia did not stop its mobilisation, then Germany would attack France. Viviani, newly arrived back in France, knew nothing of a Russian general mobilisation, and asked his ambassador in St. Petersburg for information. Marshal Joesph Joffre of the French Army asked for permission to order a general mobilisation. His request was refused.

German mobilisation - When the word reached Berlin of Russian general mobilisation, Wilhelm agreed to sign the orders for German mobilisation, and German troops began preparations to enter Luxembourg and Belgium as a preliminary towards invading France. As the historian Fritz Fischer noted, Bethmann Hollweg’s gamble in waiting for Russian mobilisation had paid off, and the Social Democrats rallied to support the government. The Bavarian military attaché recorded that he learned of Russian mobilisation:

“I run to the War Ministry. Beaming faces everywhere. Everyone is shaking hands in the corridors: people congratulate one another one for being over the hurdle.”

 Rumours arrive in London of German troops crossing the French frontier – true or not, they are reported as fact and help to fuel a growing sense that Germany wants trouble

Under the Schlieffen Plan, for Germany to mobilise was to mean war because as part of the plan, German troops as they were called up were to invade Belgium automatically. Unlike the war plans of the other powers, for Germany to mobilise was to go to war. Both Moltke and Falkenhayn told the government that Germany should declare war even were Russia to offer to negotiate.

Declaration of war from the German Empire 31 July 1914. Signed by the German Kaiser Wilhelm II. Countersigned by the Reichs-Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg 

In London, Asquith wrote to Stanley that “the general opinion at present—particularly strong in the City—is to keep out at all costs”. The British Cabinet was badly divided with David Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer being strongly opposed to Britain becoming involved in a war. The Conservatives promised the government if the anti-war Liberal ministers were to resign, they would enter the government to support going to war. F.E. Smith told Churchill that the Conservatives would support a war against Germany were France attacked.

Sir Edward Grey goes to the furthest possible limit in endeavouring to persuade Germany to assist him in squaring matters between Austria and Serbia.  Asks France and Germany whether they intend to respect Belgian neutrality; France says, "certainly", Germany refuses to reply.  British Cabinet not yet prepared to give France definite pledge of assistance.

Financial crisis in London. 

Panic is hitting the markets; the bank rate doubles overnight to 8 per cent and people are queuing at the Bank of England to exchange notes for gold. Stock Exchange closed.

Belgian mobilisation decreed for following day.

Shocking news reaches London in the evening. Jean Jaures, the French Socialist leader and anti-war campaigner – has been assassinated

On July 31st, Kaiser Wilhelm II wrote in a lengthy commentary: "For I no longer have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves—knowing that our treaty obligations compel us to support Austria-Hungary—to use the Austro-Serb conflict as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us. ... Our dilemma over keeping faith with the old and honourable Emperor has been exploited to create a situation which gives England the excuse she has been seeking to annihilate us with a spurious appearance of justice on the pretext that she is helping France and maintaining the well-known Balance of Power in Europe, i.e. playing off all European States for her own benefit against us."

Information resourced from the following sites:

http://blog.oup.com/2014/07/31-july-1914-mobilization-means-war/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_Ultimatum#Content_of_the_Austro-Hungarian_ultimatum_to_Serbia

http://www.firstworldwar.com/onthisday/1914_07_31.htm

http://www.worldwar1.com/tlplot.htm

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/richardpreston/100282098/ww1-4-days-to-go-martial-law-declared-in-germany-in-britain-the-bank-rate-doubles-and-the-stock-exchange-closes/

37 Day Count Down to War - Day 34

July 30th 1914

On July 30th, Nicholas sent a message to Wilhelm informing him that he had ordered partial mobiliation against Austria, and asking him to do his utmost for a peaceful solution. Upon hearing of Russia’s partial mobilisation, Wilhelm wrote: "Then I must mobilise too." The German Ambassador in St. Petersburg informed Nicholas that Germany would mobilise if Russia did not demobilise at once. The German military attaché in Russia reported that:

"I have the impression that they [the Russians] have mobilised here from a dread of coming events without aggressive intentions and are now frightened at what they have brought about."

At the same time, Nicholas’ order for a partial mobilisation met with protests from both Sazonov and the Russian War Minister General Valdimir Sukhomlinov, who insisted partial mobilisation was not technically possible, and that, given Germany’s attitude, a general mobilisation was required. Nicholas at first ordered a general mobilisation, and then after receiving an appeal for peace from Wilhelm cancelled it as a sign of his good faith. The cancellation of general mobilisation led to furious protests from Sukhomlinov, Sazonov, and Russia’s top generals, all urging Nicholas to reinstate it. Under strong pressure, Nicholas gave in and ordered a general mobilisation on the 30th.

Vladimir Sukhomlinov, Minister of War of the Russian Empire.

Cossacks are pictured, armed and ready

After receiving information from Rome that Serbia was now ready "on condition of certain interpretations, to swallow even Articles 5 and 6, that is, the whole Austrian ultimatum," Bethmann forwarded this to Vienna at 12:30 a.m., July 30th, and added:

"Please show this to Berchtold immediately and add that we regard such a yielding on Serbia’s part as a suitable basis for negotiations along with an occupation of a part of Serbian territory as a pledge." Berchtold replied that though the acceptance of the Austrian Note would have been satisfactory before hostilities had begun, "now after a state of war has begun, Austria's conditions must naturally take another tone." In response, Bethmann, now aware of the Russian order for partial mobilisation, fired off several telegrams in the early morning of July 30th.

Meanwhile on a day when the clouds over Europe were to darken markedly,  the Austrian bombardment of Belgrade continues. Serbian guns reply sporadically and an Austrian gunboat is damaged

at 2:55 a.m., July 30th, Bethmann telegraphs Vienna:

"The refusal of every exchange of views with St. Petersburg would be a serious mistake, for it provokes Russia precisely to armed interference, which Austria is primarily concerned in avoiding. We are ready, to be sure, to fulfill our obligations as an ally, but we must refuse to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world conflagration frivolously and in disregard of our advice. Please say this to Count Berchtold at once with all emphasis and with great seriousness."

At three a.m., July 30th, Bethmann wires Vienna again:

"If Austria refuses all negotiations, we are face to face with a conflagration in which England will be against us . . . under these circumstances we must urgently and emphatically urge upon the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the adoption of mediation in accordance with the above honorable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences which would otherwise follow would be, for Austria and us, an uncommonly heavy one."

Professor Fay wrote that "To this urgent request by Germany for Austria’s acceptance of a solution, which perhaps even yet might have avoided the conflagration of Europe, Berchtold gave no definite or frank answer."

These early-morning telegrams from Bethmann were given by Tschirschky to Berchtold while the two men were at lunch on Thursday, July 30th. Immediately afterwards, Tschirschky reported to Berlin that:

"Berchtold listened pale and silent while they {the Bethmann telegrams} were read through twice; Count Forgach took notes. Finally, Berchtold said he would at once lay the matter before the Emperor."

After Berchtold had departed for his audience with Emperor Franz Joseph (on the afternoon of Thursday, July 30th), Bethmann was told by Berchtold’s advisors (Forgach and Hoyos) that he should not expect a reply until the following morning (Friday, July 31st), for the reason that Tisza, who would not be in Vienna until then, must be consulted.

Bethmann spent the remainder of the day, July 30th, continuing to impress Vienna with the need for negotiations and to inform the Powers of his mediation efforts.

But in the evening of that hopeful day, Thursday, July 30th, with Berlin’s strenuous efforts to persuade Vienna to some form of negotiation, and with Bethmann actually awaiting a response from Berchtold, Russia gave the order for full mobilisation.

When the German Emperor learned that, were Germany to attack France and Russia, Britain would in all likelihood not remain neutral, he launched a vehement rant, denouncing Britain as "that filthy nation of grocers." That same day, the anti-Russian German-Turkish alliance was signed. Moltke passed on a message to Conrad asking for general mobilisation as a prelude to a war against Russia.

At 9:00 p.m. on July 30th, Bethmann Hollweg gave in to Moltke and Falkenhayn’s repeated demands and promised them that Germany would issue a proclamation of "imminent danger of war" at noon the next day regardless of whether Russia began a general mobilisation or not.

Later that day, Bethmann sent a message to the German ambassador to Vienna increasing pressure to accept the halt-in-Belgrade proposal, saying that: "If Vienna...refuses...to give way at all, it will hardly be possible to place the blame on Russia for the outbreak of the European conflagration. H.M. has, on the request of the Tsar, undertaken to intervene in Vienna because he could not refuse without awakening an irrefutable suspicion that we wanted war...If these efforts of Britain’s meet with success, while Vienna refuses everything, Vienna will prove that it is set on having a war, into which we are dragged, while Russia remains free of guilt. This puts us in a quite impossible position in the eyes of our own people. We can therefore only urgently recommend Vienna to accept Grey’s proposal, which safeguards its position in every way." Bethmann could not go to war in support of Austrian intransigence under such circumstances. But shortly afterwards, "as soon as news of Russia's general mobilization began to arrive in Berlin" the Chancellor instructed the ambassador in Vienna "that all mediation attempts be stopped", and the directive be suspended. Fritz Fischer and some other scholars have maintained the alternative view that Prince Henry's assurances that King George had promised him that Britain would remain neutral accounted for the change. Fischer notes that the telegram reporting these "vague" assurances arrived 12 minutes before the dispatch of the suspending telegram and that Bethmann himself justified the cancellation that way, while acknowledging that before then Bethmann had already prepared, but not yet sent, a telegram to Vienna explaining that he had "cancelled execution of instructions in No. 200, because the General Staff has just informed me that military measures of our neighbors, especially in the east, compel speedy decision if we are not to be taken by surprise."

Upon arriving back in France, the French Premier Rene Viviani sent a message to St. Petersburg asking that "in the precautionary measures and defensive measures to which Russia believes herself obliged to resort, she should not immediately proceed to any measure which might offer Germany the pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces.” French troops were ordered to pull back six miles (10 km) from the German frontier as a sign of France’s peaceful intentions.

The British Prime Minister, Asquith, wrote to Stanley:

"The European situation is at least one degree worse than it was yesterday, and has not been improved by a rather shameless attempt on the part of Germany to buy our neutrality during the war by promises that she will not annex French territory (except colonies) or Holland or Belgium. There is something very crude & childlike about German diplomacy. Meanwhile the French are beginning to press in the opposite sense, as the Russians have been doing for some time. The City, wh. is in a terrible state of depression and paralysis, is the time being all against English intervention.”

In Britain, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York ask that people should pray for peace

Information resourced from the following sites:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/onthisday/1914_07_30.htm

http://www.worldwar1.com/tlplot.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_Ultimatum#Content_of_the_Austro-Hungarian_ultimatum_to_Serbia

37 Day Count Down to War - Day 30

Day 30 - July 26th 1914

On July 26, Count Berchtold rejected Grey’s mediation offer, and wrote that if a localisation should not prove possible, then the Dual Monarchy was counting, “with gratitude”, on Germany's support “if a struggle against another adversary is forced on us”. That same day, General Von Moltke sent a message to Belgium demanding that German troops be allowed to pass through that kingdom “in the event of an imminent war against France and Russia”. 

Bethmann Hollweg

Bethmann Hollweg in a message to the German Ambassadors in London, Paris and St. Petersburg stated that the principal aim of German foreign policy now was to make it appear that Russia had forced Germany into a war, in order to keep Britain neutral and ensure that German public opinion would back the war effort. Bethmann Hollweg advised Wilhelm to send Nicholas a telegram, which he assured the Emperor was for public relations purposes only. AsBethmann Hollweg put it, “If war should come after all, such a telegram would make Russia’s guilt glaringly plain”. Moltke visited the German Foreign Ministry to advise Jagow that Germany should start drafting an ultimatum to justify an invasion of Belgium. Later, Moltke met with Bethmann Hollweg, and told his wife later that same day that he had informed the Chancellor he was “very dissatisfied” that Germany had not yet attacked Russia.

On July 26, in St. Petersburg, the German Ambassador von Pourtalès told Sazonov to reject Grey’s offer of a summit in London, stating that the proposed conference was “too unwieldy”, and if Russia were serious about saving the peace, they would negotiate directly with the Austrians. Sazonov replied that he was willing to see Serbia accept almost all of the Austrian demands, and following von Pourtalès’s advice, rejected Grey’s conference proposal in favour of direct talks with the Austrians. Von Pourtalès reported to Germany that Sazonov was being “more conciliatory”, seeking “to find a bridge...to satisfy...Austrian demands” and willing to do almost anything to save the peace. At the same time, von Pourtalès warned that changes in the Balkan balance of power would be regarded as a highly unfriendly act by Russia. The following Austro-Russian talks were sabotaged by Austria’s refusal to abandon any of the demands on Serbia As a preparatory move in case a war did break out, and Britain were to become involved, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty, ordered the British fleet not to disperse as planned, arguing that news of the British move might serve as a deterrent to war, and thus help persuade Germany to put pressure on Austria to abandon some of the more outrageous demands in their ultimatum. Grey stated that a compromise solution could be worked out if Germany and Britain were to work together. His approach generated opposition from British officials, who felt the Germans were dealing with the crisis in bad faith. Nicolson warned Grey that in his opinion “Berlin is playing with us”. Grey for his part, rejected Nicolson's assessment, and believed that Germany was interested in stopping a general war.
Philippe Berthelot, the political director of the Quai d’Orsay told Wilhelm von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Paris that “to my simple mind Germany’s attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war”. In Vienna, a dispute began between Conrad and Berchtold about when Austria should begin operations. Their conversation ran as follows: Berchtold: “We should like to deliver the declaration of war on Serbia as soon as possible so as to put an end to diverse influences. When do you want the declaration of war? Conrad: Only when we have progressed far enough for operations to begin immediately—on approximately August 12th. Berchtold: “The diplomatic situation will not hold as long as that.”
In summary:
Germany thinks Russia will not fight, but threatens mobilisation, i.e. war, if Russia does not stop her preparations, and asks Entente States to keep Russia quiet.  

Kaiser and German Fleet return from Norway.

Conrad informs Berchtold that he will not be ready for full military action before 15-Aug-1914. Shelling would have to do until then.

The Kaiser's first words to Bethmann-Hollweg upon his return - "How did it all happen?"

Austria begins to mobilise eight corps on Russian frontier.

Sir Edward Grey suggests Conference of Ambassadors in London.

Russia declares she will mobilise on Austrian frontier if Austria crosses Serbian frontier.  General Putnik released with apologies.

A copy of the ultimatum is wired to Poincare aboard the French battle cruiser France.

Montenegro orders mobilisation.

Information resourced from the following sites:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/onthisday/1914_07_26.htm
http://www.worldwar1.com/tlplot.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_Ultimatum#Content_of_the_Austro-Hungarian_ultimatum_to_Serbia
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/richardpreston/100281464/ww1-9-days-to-go-there-is-war-fever-in-vienna-the-city-has-a-black-saturday/

37 Day Count Down to War - Day 28

Day 28 - July 24

Pasic returns to Belgrade at 5:00 am.

Giesl and staff begin burning sensitive diplomatic papers and cipher books. They are already preparing for their departure from Belgrade on tomorrow's evening train.

Prince Alexander urgently wires the Russian Czar for assistance and guidance in the matter.

Russia advises Pasic to "proceed with extreme caution." 

Serbia makes the contents of the ultimatum public in a hope to gain public support. The world is aghast at the contents. They ask for the impossible. Sir Edward Grey says: "...never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character".  He at once proposes four-Power (Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy) mediation.

The Russian War Minister Vladmir Sukhomlinov

The Navy Minister Admiral Ivan Grigorovich

The Russian Council of Ministers met to decide their response to the crisis. The Russian Agriculture Minister Alexander Krivoshein, who was especially trusted by Nicholas, noted that:

"...our rearmament programme had not been comp

leted and it seemed doubtful whether our Army and Fleet would ever be able to compete with those of Germany and Austria-Hungary as regards modern technical efficiency...No one in Russia desired a war. The disastrous consequences of the Rusoo - Japanese War had shown the grave danger which Russia would run in case of hostilities. Consequently our policy should aim at reducing the possibility of a European war, but if we remained passive we would attain our objectives...In his view stronger language than we had used hitherto was desirable."

Sazonov stated that Russia had usually been moderate in its foreign policy, but “Germany looked upon our concessions as so many proofs of our weakness and far from having prevented our neighbours from using aggressive methods, we had encouraged them.” The Russian War Minister Vladmir Sukhomlinov and the Navy Minister Admiral Ivan Grigorovich stated that Russia was not ready for a war against either Austria or Germany, but that “...hesitation was no longer appropriate as far as the Imperial government was concerned. They saw no objection to a display of greater firmness in our diplomatic negotiations”. The Russian government again asked Austria to extend the deadline, and advised the Serbs to offer as little resistance as possible to the terms of the Austrian ultimatum.Finally to deter Austria from war, the Russian Council of Ministers ordered a partial mobilization against Austria.

Russian policy was to pressure the Serbs to accept the ultimatum as much as possible without being humiliated too much. Russia was most anxious to avoid a war because the Great Military Programme was not to be completed until 1917, and Russia was otherwise not ready for war. Because all of France’s leaders, including President Poincare and Rene Viviani, were at sea on the battleship France, returning from the summit in St. Petersburg, the acting head of the French government, Jean-Baptiste Bienvenu- Martin took no line on the ultimatum. In addition, the Germans jammed the radio messages, at least garbling contacts between the ship-borne French leaders and Paris, and possibly blocking them completely.

Concerning the summit at St. Petersburg, Alfred Fabre-Luce has concluded the following:

There is, then, no possible doubt about the attitude taken by Poincaré at St. Petersburg between the 20th and the 23rd of July. Without any knowledge whatever of the Austrian demands or of the policy of Germany in the circumstances, he assumed a position of energetic opposition to the Central Powers, gave this opposition a very specific character, and never modified it in the slightest degree to the very end. 

The Kaiser hears about the ultimatum from his yacht's radio officer who read it in the Norwegian newspaper. 

Information resourced from the following sites:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/onthisday/1914_07_24.htm

http://www.worldwar1.com/tlplot.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I

37 Day Count Down to War - Day 27

23rd July 1914

The 23rd July was the actual presentation of Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia at Belgrade at 6 p.m., demanding answer within 48 hours. The Austrian Minister in Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, presented the ultimatum to the Serbian government. At the same time, and having a strong expectation of Serbian rejection, the Austrian Army opened its war book, and began preparations for hostilities Publication of the Ultimatum was presented in Vienna shortly afterwards.  Bethmann-Hollweg writes circular to German Ambassadors saying "action and demands of Austria-Hungary fully justified".  [Moment of presentation well-chosen: following absent from their posts: Serbian Prime Minister (Pashich), Kaiser (Norway), Franz Josef (Ischl), Poincare and Viviani (Russia), Shebeko (Russian Ambassador in Vienna), Goschen (British Ambassador in Berlin).

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen

 On the night of July 23, the Serbian Regent, Crown Prince Alexander, visited the Russian legation to "express his despair over the Austrian ultimatum, compliance with which he regards as an absolute impossibility for a state which had the slightest regard for its dignity. Both the Regent and Pasic asked for Russian support, which was refused. Sazonov offered the Serbs only moral support while Nicholas told the Serbs to simply accept the ultimatum, and hope that international opinion would force the Austrians to change their minds. Both Russia and France, because of their military weaknesses, were most disinclined to risk a war with Germany in 1914, and hence the pressure on Serbia to accede to the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Because the Austrians had repeatedly promised the Russians that nothing was planned against Serbia that summer, their harsh ultimatum did not do much to antagonize Sazonov.

On this day 100 years ago all German officers' leave stopped

Herbert Asquith, the Prime Minister, spends the afternoon of July 23 hosting a garden party at 10 Downing Street, which is attended by a cluster of European diplomats and ambassadors – Serbia is represented, though not, it appears, Austria and Germany

And if minds are not on garden parties, then they are planning summer holidays – and considering, publishers Hodder and Stoughton hope, which novels to pack

Information resourced from the following sites:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_Ultimatum#Content_of_the_Austro-Hungarian_ultimatum_to_Serbia

http://www.firstworldwar.com/onthisday/1914_07_23.htm

http://www.worldwar1.com/tlplot.htm

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/richardpreston/100281120/ww1-12-days-to-go-austria-delivers-its-ultimatum-to-serbia-in-britain-the-schools-break-up-for-the-summer-holidays/

37 Day Count Down to War - Day 23

19th July - Day 23

Final reports from Spithead reinforce the impression from the last few days that the assembled might of the Royal Navy is an awe-inspiring sight. The thunder of the guns saluting the King is particularly impressive to our correspondent

 From the Continent, the latest reports from Vienna suggest that opinion towards Serbia is hardening

From Berlin comes the suggestion that Austria-Hungary is edging towards an ultimatum to Serbia

The Austrian Ministerial Council meets in secret. It is decided that Conrad shall be given his chance and Serbia will be "beaten to earth."

The Ultimatum to Serbia is drafted.

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum demanded from the Serbian state to formally and publicly condemn the "dangerous propaganda" against Austria-Hungary, the ultimate aim of which, it claimed, is to "detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it". Moreover, Belgrade should "suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda".

Moreover, the Serbian government should

1. Suppress all publications which "incite hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy" and are "directed against its territorial integrity".
2. Dissolve the Serbian nationalist organisation "Narodna Odrana" ("The People's Defense") and all other such societies in Serbia.
3. Eliminate without delay from schoolbooks and public documents all "propaganda against Austria-Hungary".
4. Remove from the Serbian military and civil administration all officers and functionaries whose names the Austro-Hungarian Government will provide.
5. Accept in Serbia "representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government" for the "suppression of subversive movements".
6. Bring to trial all accessories to the Archduke's assassination and allow "Austro-Hungarian delegates" (law enforcement officers) to take part in the investigations.
7. Arrest Major Vojislav Tankosić and civil servant Milan Ciganović who were named as participants in the assassination plot.
8. Cease the cooperation of the Serbian authorities in the "traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier"; dismiss and punish the officials of Sabac andLoznica frontier service, "guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime".
9. Provide "explanations" to the Austro-Hungarian Government regarding "Serbian officials" who have expressed themselves in interviews "in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government".
10. Notify the Austro-Hungarian Government "without delay" of the execution of the measures comprised in the ultimatum.

The Austro-Hungarian Government, concluded the document, was expecting the reply of the Serbian Government at the latest by 5 o'clock on Saturday evening, July 25th, 1914.

An Appendix to the main text listed various details from "the crime investigation undertaken at court in Sarajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his comrades on account of the assassination", which allegedly demonstrated the culpability and assistance provided to the conspirators by various Serbian officials.

Instructions were given to the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, Baron von Gieslingen, whereby if "no unconditionally positive answer" is received by the Serbian government within "the 48-hour deadline" of the ultimatum ("as measured from the day and hour of your announcing it"), the Minister should proceed to leave the Austro-Hungarian Embassy of Belgrade together with all its personnel.

Information resourced from the following sites

http://www.worldwar1.com/tlplot.htm

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/richardpreston/100280678/ww1-16-days-to-go-a-mighty-salute-for-the-king-at-spithead-austria-is-edging-towards-an-ultimatum-to-serbia/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_Ultimatum#Content_of_the_Austro-Hungarian_ultimatum_to_Serbia